Abstract-Cloud providers such as Google are interested in fostering research on the daunting technical challenges they face in supporting planetary-scale distributed systems, but no academic organizations have similar scale systems on which to experiment. Fortunately, good research can still be done using traces of real-life production workloads, but there are risks in releasing such data, including inadvertently disclosing confidential or proprietary information, as happened with the Netflix Prize data. This paper discusses these risks, and our approach to them, which we call systematic obfuscation. It protects proprietary and personal data while leaving it possible to answer interesting research questions. We explain and motivate some of the risks and concerns and propose how they can best be mitigated, using as an example our recent publication of a monthlong trace of a production system workload on a 11k-machine cluster.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many in industry want to guide academic work to increase its relevance to their company's technical challenges, and believe that giving academic researchers access to relevant workloads would help both groups. Traces of production systems are widely used within industry. Unfortunately, release of these datasets is rare, because they may contain sensitive commercial or private information, or provide indirect evidence from which such information can be deduced.
This paper reports on techniques we developed to remove commercially sensitive information from production traces in a way that doesnt diminish the value of the traces to researchers. We call this process obfuscating the trace; it is a generalization of anonymization, which is frequently used to describe the removal of personal information and replacing the names of various components with hard-to-guess standins. Even though commercial concerns may not be relevant for traces that originate in academia, careful consideration to the amount of personal identifying information (PII) they contain is still required. Depending on the type of trace, this may be a major issue or simply not a problem (e.g., resource usage data from a scientific batch processing facility is largely unrelated to personal activities).
Obfuscation is surprisingly hard to do well. One factor that makes it difficult is that outsiders can use information from outside a trace to discover its secrets. This information can be simple facts about the world-like that "people often search for their own name" or "many programs request CPUs in units of a complete core". It is not possible to enumerate all such discoveries, so the problem is one of managing risk.
The methodology described in the paper is quite general. To ground our discussion of it, we use the following as a running example. We recently released a workload trace of one of Googles compute clusters [38] . The trace covers work submitted for 11,000 nodes for 29 days in the form of information about jobs submitted by users; each job is made up of one or more tasks, each of which has associated requirements and resource usage data. Although the trace includes data about services that deal with data about external customers, the system being traced touches relatively little personal information, so our primary concern was not privacy; instead, we were concerned about accidentally revealing certain details about the hardware and software used in the cluster.
A. Contributions
We make three main contributions in this paper. (1) We present concerns that commercial organizations often have about the risks of releasing traces from production systems. (2) We introduce mechanisms for obfuscating traces in a way that has little impact on the value of the traces to researchers, but which also helps alleviate these concerns. (3) We describe how we applied these mechanisms to a trace from a production cluster at Google; they are summarized in Table I .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II surveys prior work. Section III summarizes why companies suppress certain information in production traces, and section IV discusses best practices for trace obfuscation. Section V describes difficulties inherent in trace obfuscation and some of the perils of hiding too much information. We illustrate the choices we made for our own trace in section VI, and end with some conclusions in section VII.
II. PRIOR WORK
Several traces of real systems have been released to the public. Almost any trace has some issues that prevent its release in its raw form; this section lists a few examples, and what was done about these issues.
Well-studied classes of traces include filesystem accesses and network traffic. Several traces of this type from academic and research environments are publicly available (e.g., [19] , [22] , [33] ). The traces use obfuscation techniques that range from removing HTTP request and response bodies (in an HTTP trace) to replacing all web page URLs and usernames with opaque identifiers (in an home web-access trace). Regardless of the degree of obfuscation, the LBNL-hosted Internet Trace Archive [19] requires that "archive users agree to not perform traffic analysis aimed at circumventing the degree of privacy present in the trace". 1 Recent network traces have enjoyed more systematic approach to anonymization (e.g., [28] ). Since these traces are used to evaluate systems that work on raw network traffic, these techniques focus on transforming network traces to "equivalent" traces that omit private information. Most notably, this requires omitting raw IP addresses, but more subtle channels also need to be removed, such as TCP timestamps (which can identifying machines [20] ) or HTTP response size patterns (which can identify web sites [34] ).
Several traces of network filesystem activity have been created by researchers (such as [5] , [12] , [17] , [33] ), usually from their own installations. Some of these traces are even from commercial installations [3] . In obfuscating these traces, it has usually been considered sufficient to replace each component of filenames and each username with a distinct identifier, but this may still leak some information about directory structures, file types, and so on.
Some research grid computing installations (e.g., [16] ) and supercomputer installations (e.g., [29] ) have made batch jobscheduler traces available. These traces typically include only relatively coarse-grained information about resource demands and usage. Obfuscation-if any-typically consists of replacing user, group and (possibly) job names with unique identifiers. Users of these systems do not generally feel the need to hide the fact that they are using them, or the types of programs they are running. Many of the datasets that have been released to the general public are somewhat restricted in nature: for example, a collection of disk failure information [8] was released to allow others to reproduce the results of a paper on the topic.
Although research based on commercial workloads is not infrequent, there are few publicly-available commercial datasets and so analyses of commercial datasets are usually performed within the providing company, or by private arrangement with 1 One of the larger issues for the community is the eagerness with which some people reverse-engineer trace data and publish obviously-sensitive results, apparently without considering the discouraging effects this will have on prospective future trace providers. Non-disclosure agreements are sometimes used in an attempt to reduce such risks, but they have other drawbacks, and are outside the scope of this paper. a research group. For example, the first author's (academic) research group has obtained batch workload traces from some large Internet companies, but these were available only under an agreement not to share the trace widely.
Research labs of companies will sometimes release data about their own systems, which are less commercially sensitive than systems running end-user workloads. For example, storage-system traces were made available for some research systems at HP Labs [18] , but almost no examples of traces from commercial systems, whether running production code or benchmarks. One of the reasons offered was a fear of "giving away a commercial advantage"; another was "getting the system managers to agree; they saw no point in releasing such traces" [37] .
III. REASONS TO OBFUSCATE
There are several threats that obfuscation is meant to resist. The most publicized are privacy risks: that the trace might reveal some embarrassing information about an individual, which may have legal consequences and cause public-relations difficulties. Another threat is the accidental release of proprietary information to competitors or customers. Another is leaking information that a malicious (or aggressive) competitor might use to damage the trace provider business through financial, political, or technical means -for example, a trace might accidentally reveal how to "game" one of the provider's services. This list is by no means exhaustive; we expand a little on a few of them below.
A. Competitive concerns
There are several types of trade secrets that a company may want to avoid revealing through traces. Exact policies differ between companies; there is no single formula. Our examples are intended to illustrate common concerns that make releasing commercial traces challenging.
One class of secrets is information about unreleased products. When leaked, this can create substantial media attention, bypass carefully-planned marketing campaigns, force premature release (or delays), and allow competitors to undermine a new product, resulting in lost revenue. The resulting damages can run to millions of dollars.
Protecting information about a new product may be non trivial if prototypes of it are using shared infrastructure services that are being traced. This is not easy to bypass by releasing only traces of systems that serve no unannounced productsbeside the difficulty of determining whether this is happening (it may not be known), or manually selecting parts of larger workloads (it may be too hard at scale), some products may not be acknowledged publicly for many years, so any traces old enough to meet the requirement will likely be long out of date.
Companies often want to avoid giving their competitors performance targets to aim for. Knowing that certain performance goals are practical would allow competitors to better allocate their engineering resources. For example, the existence of Google's MapReduce system is public, but releasing precise performance information would likely create an instant benchmark for other MapReduce implementations. This effect can be seen with the TeraSort benchmark: one year after Google released their time (68 seconds), Yahoo's Hadoop engineers had approximately equalled that time [27] . While there are benefits to releasing explicit performance targets, companies want to make such decisions explicitly.
Less frequently publicized, but still potentially bad, is information that could be useful to competitors or malicious third-parties. These groups may be interested in inferring the company's supply chains, algorithms used for handling abuse, or the exact versions of hardware and software used internally. For example, companies running large scale services typically must pick some hardware components several years in advance of their production deployments, and may be committed to buying these particular components to gain the price discounts they rely on; such large purchases may account for a substantial portion of the entire market for some hardware components, and thus a potential target. A malicious competitor could increase costs by bidding up the price or causing an artificial shortage of selected, critical components, such as FLASH chips, or a particular kind of processor. Supply-chain management is hard enough without complicating it by introducing knowledgeable antagonistic agents.
Another concern is vulnerabilities to external attacks. Since large-scale services tend to have relatively homogeneous hardware, firmware, and software platforms, each of these components is a high-value target. To make attacks more expensive to perform, service operators want attackers to have to guess the configurations and waste resources attacking systems the operator does not have.
Information about the actual resources in each physical machine (e.g., the amount of RAM, number of cores, the network bandwidth) is often sensitive because it could allow a third party to infer performance targets, supply chains, and exact hardware configurations. So is information that might reveal the total size of a company's computing resources, which may implicitly provide financial and capability data that a company would prefer to keep secret from its competitors, customers, and even suppliers.
B. Privacy obligations
The most obvious reason to obfuscate a trace of an online service is because end users may have provided (or generated) data with the expectation it would remain private. For example, these services may manage e-mail addresses, word processing documents, and web viewing and searching history. To alleviate regulatory concerns and preserve user confidence, service providers typically promise not to release any personally identifiable information (PII). Such information is varyingly defined to include information that "can be used to contact or identify [users]" [30] or that "personally identifies [users] . . . or can be reasonably linked to such information" [15] . Laws and regulations often attempt to enforce similar requirements.
Identification cannot be prevented by simply omitting names, social security numbers, postal addresses, e-mail addresses, etc. Violations in privacy from anonymized' database releases can arise from surprising correlations between the released data and publicly available data about people [24] , [25] . For example, gender, birth date and 5-digit zip code uniquely identify around 63% of Americans [14] .
However, many interesting traces, such as ours, are intended to characterize hardware and software and their behaviors, not end users. Such traces do not need to include any information correlating user requests to each other or identifying the specific resource that an end user was served by. The primary personal privacy concern comes from the messiness of the data: logs intended to show technical information may include portions of requests, database keys, file names, etc. Unfortunately, the need to remove such information generally makes it impossible to release free-form logs without extensive, time consuming normalization of their contents.
IV. OBFUSCATION STRATEGIES
In this section, we discuss a few common strategies used to protect or remove sensitive information from a trace.
To ground the discussion, we consider a trace that contains many records made up of several fields, each of which can be thought of as defining (or having) a "data type. The main obfuscation techniques are applied to a data-type at a time, as follows:
• Culling: certain elements of the original trace data (e.g., fields in a trace record) are omitted. This is often used on traces of end user actions, to eliminate PII. Because raw trace data may contain fields that are user or product names or even excerpts of processed data, obfuscation almost always requires limiting the types of data in the released trace and culling (or aggressively transforming) any free-form text fields. Culling also helps make traces more compact. The biggest risk is that of excising too much information.
• Subsetting: selecting only a part of the available data (e.g., only certain clusters to trace from the ones a company runs). This can be a more productive strategy than culling since many researchers have more uses for nearly-complete, rich, representative data for a portion of a system than partial data for all of it.
• Transformation: including the information in a different form (e.g., replacing names by their list position after they have been sorted; replacing a text string by its hash).
• Aggregation: replacing the actual data with a summary, e.g., a distribution of job inter-arrival times, rather than the actual starting times.
The choice of which technique to use should be driven by the conflicting goals of making the trace useful while hiding sensitive data. We recommend asking "what should a user be able to do? (e.g., "testing scheduling against limited resources') and working backwards to the information needed to accomplish that-any less risks making the traces unhelpful.
The rest of this section discusses some of the more useful transformations in greater detail.
A. Comparison-preserving obfuscations
Probably the most common obfuscation transformation is to hide the actual values, such as user names. The trick is to preserve important relationships between the values, e.g., to make it possible to determine that a set of records describe jobs submitted by the same user. There are several common transformations used for this purpose, including: 1) Put all visible values for a data type in some information-free order (such as random order or the order they first appear in the trace); assign them unique numbers in this order; include only the numbers in the output trace. 2) Take a keyed cryptographic fixed-sized hash of the original value (such as HMAC-SHA256) using a secret key that is unique over some space (e.g., the data type). 3) Encrypt the values using a key that is unique to the data type (an approach like this is implemented by HP Labs' DataSeries library [4] ). This permits recovery of the original values with only the obfuscated value and the chosen key. To allow testing for value-equality in a data type, we want the process to produce the same outputs for the same input values, so the encryption should not introduce randomization that would prevent this. An example of a suitable scheme is AES-CBC [11] with a non-random initialization vector (IV). To prevent detection of common prefixes in values, the IV should still be chosen in an unpredictable way, such as using a keyed cryptographic hash of the value. Approach 1 produces compact results and is ideal when the space of all visible values is easily determined in advance. Approach 3 has the advantage of being reversible by the trace providers, but it produces much larger identifiers (especially if everything is padded to hide length information). Approaches 2 and 3 have the advantage of not requiring an explicit valuecollecting phase and so are better suited to data types with many possible values.
In any case, trace producers should make an explicit decision about what data types should be matched to, or correlatable with, other data types. Those where the trace consumer should be able to identify equality relationships should use the same transformation, and those which the trace consumer should not be able to correlate should use independent transformations, such as different cryptographic keys or list of values.
When the trace consumer should be able to identify more than equality relationships within a data type, a different type of transformation is required. One way to allow inequality and ordering comparisons across discrete values, while hiding the actual values, is to gather all the values for the data type, sort them, and replace each value by its index into this list. This is likely to be a useful for parameters like software and hardware versions. This technique may also be applicable to parameters whose absolute numerical value is meaningful to performance-such as the number of disks on a machine-but restricts the kind of analyses that can be done (e.g., this cannot readily support determining the mean load on a disk drive).
B. Continuous measurements
Continuous-valued measurements are trickier to obfuscate. There are several properties of such information that a trace producer may want to preserve, such as: 1) whether two values differ by a large amount and in what direction; 2) the approximate ratio between any two values; 3) the approximate magnitude of each value; or 4) the presence of small differences between values; Information of type (2) or (3) is likely to be most useful for researchers since they are straightforward to use for replaying a trace to study its effects. If only the ratios matter (e.g., type (2)), a standard obfuscation approach is to rescale the values in some uninformative, linear way: e.g., such that the median or maximum data value is scaled to 1.0. To avoid providing information of type (4), the precision can be reduced, e.g., by rounding values to a small number of digits.
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to reveal ratios without also providing approximate magnitudes, which may leak sensitive information (e.g., the distribution of the number of cores per CPU in a cluster of machines). If someone examining the trace can estimate the true value of any one sample, then they can use that information to reveal the approximate magnitude of all samples in the trace.
For resource consumption in particular, a task might be using a certain number of some discrete resources like disk drives or CPU cores. A natural measure of the usage of each of these discrete resources is continuous: e.g., CPU-seconds used per second or disk read bandwidth achieved, so it might be thought that simply rescaling the consumption would be good enough. Not so. It is likely that a disproportionate share of programs will fully utilize all of a discrete resource such as a CPU core, so this may be used to reveal the actual resources counts.
For example, Figure 1 shows an excerpt from the histogram of task CPU utilization measurements on a cluster at a Google. Each measurement represents the number of CPU-seconds per second used by a task on a single machine over the measurement time period, which is 5 minutes. It is easy to see from this histogram where "1 core" is because a disproportionate number of task samples show one core being fully utilized.
This effect might be mitigated by providing much less precision in the provided ratios or averaging the utilization over longer periods of time-but a lot of precision may need to be culled. For example, the "bump near 1.0 cores is still clear when CPU usages are only given to a precision of onefifth of a core (Figure 2) .
Averaging over long periods of time will diminish the effect because fewer samples will experience full utilization of a unit of the resource. Like removing precision in magnitude, such averaging would clearly diminish the utility of the trace, since Fig. 1 . Histogram of task CPU utilization measurements from a cluster at Google. The x-axis represents the number of CPU-seconds per second a task used on a machine during a 5-minute measurement period. The data includes all available measurements of all tasks on the cluster over many days, except that measurements greater than 2.4 CPU-seconds per second are omitted. These measurements were bucketed into 0.01 CPU-second per second bins; the y-axis represents the portion of measurements falling into each bin. it would require hiding the existence of tasks with sustained CPU bursts.
A trace provider might instead be tempted to try to distort the distribution. Unfortunately, many examples of combining two resource usages may reveal the shape of the distortion. Any useful distortion will preserve the property that values which are originally close will be close in the resulting distribution. Given this, one can bucket the distorted distribution into N fixed sized buckets and approximate the inverse of the distortion , this information produces an overdetermined system of approximate equations. This system can framed as an optimization problem to minimize some measure of the error and solved using standard techniques.
Thus, trace producers cannot rely on distorting measurements if they also provide aggregations of the measurements. This severely limits the information that can be provided since implicit aggregations-for example, the capacity of machines-are ubiquitous in any trace that measures both the incoming workload and its effects.
One could imagine that there are ways to add random noise to flatten the distinctive bumps in the distribution. Unfortunately, the noise might need to be quite large. A trace consumer can remove the noise by combining similar values together: for example, one may guess that tasks within a job have similar resource utilizations; making it possible to identify multiple (noisy) samples of a particular value. The samples can be averaged together to produce a low variance estimate of the mean.
C. Timeseries data
Traces usually contain data about the times of events. These data are particularly concerning for obfuscation because timing data from one source is easy to correlate with timing data from another source. High-precision timing information is likely to allow correlating supposedly obfuscated requests to each other and perhaps obtaining precise performance benchmarks. To prevent easy correlation with external events, a trace provider can shift all the times to some new origin (e.g., 0), and perhaps rescaling the time axis, so that absolute timings are not available. Relative timings can be obfuscated by providing only low-precision timing information. To prevent anyone from obtaining aggregate relative timing information (as might indicate performance), the precision must be low, and/or noise should be added to the raw times first: the number of times a quantity "crosses over" a rounding boundary will provide an estimate of the mean if the shape of the distribution of the times can be guessed.
Even low-precision timing information risks making it possible to correlate the trace to real-world events such as load spikes or outages. For example, an email service could be identified based only on correlating a spike in abnormal task termination events and the date of a publicized outage. This might leak information about which jobs belong to which service, even though the names may have been obscured. Even without such abnormal events, it may still be possible to distinguish between different types of services based on diurnal or weekly load patterns. Unfortunately, suppressing the information that enables this correlation is likely to render a trace unusable for most purposes.
D. Hierarchical data
Many traces contain fields that are hierarchical. Common examples are filenames and IP addresses. Filenames and IP addresses sharing a prefix are likely to be related to each other and many analyses would benefit from this information. Releasing hierarchical information needs to be done with caution. For example, previous work on obfuscating packet traces [28] , [39] has found that network traces contain scans across the IP space in sequential order. Combined with a few known IPs, this would easily permit discovery of a large number of IP mappings. Similar problems may exist for other hierarchical fields.
To preserve hierarchies, but suppress the names, one strategy is to break each hierarchical-name field into multiple fields, where each synthetic field is a prefix of the original. For example, to obfuscate the filename "/usr/bin/scp", one could divide it into three ("/usr", "/usr/bin", and "/usr/bin/scp"), and transform each of these using an equality-preserving scheme. If necessary, the obfuscated trace might be culled to include only the prefixes. If the ordering of items is likely to reveal sensitive information (as with IP addresses), then the trace provider should explicitly check the trace for scans through the name hierarchy.
E. Sampling-based strategies
Traces can also be obfuscated by subsetting data sources (e.g., providing only a short-duration trace, or only a subset of the available systems or resources). This is especially common in older traces, because of limitations on the quantity of information that could be gathered, stored, delivered, and processed.
Subsets can be picked to suppress sensitive information. For example, concerns about supply-chain disruptions can be mitigated by providing a trace from older machines that are not representative of recent acquisitions or future provisioning plans. Some services will span most of a company's infrastructure; for these services, selecting only a subset will yield an incomplete trace that cannot (for example) be replayed easily. Nevertheless, for many uses, providing more complete information for a subset of the actual machines is likely to be more useful than less precise information for the whole fleet of machines.
F. Aggregations
In addition to taking a subset of machines or jobs, one could also provide only aggregated data. That is, instead of providing records for each observed machine, job, task, request, etc., the trace provider might only provide descriptions of groups of machines, tasks, and jobs collectively. This mitigates concerns that are based on finding out information about particular jobs, users, or machines types. One form in which such aggregate data could be provided is as a synthetic trace or trace generator. This technique is proposed [13] as a way to produce exportable benchmarks from proprietary traces.
Aggregation limits the kinds of analyses that can be done on traces -in particular, on better ways to do the aggregation. The best that can be hoped for is that a trace synthesized from the aggregates will induce similar behaviors on the system as did the real one, but this is hard to test. For example, if the aggregation involves describing clustering of tasks with "similar" requirements, then a fair amount of information has already been suppressed; it is also likely that the clustering process is itself imperfect, and omits some important correlations. A synthetic trace produced from these cluster descriptions would have the same problems.
G. Differential privacy
Differential privacy [10] is a measure of the privacy provided by a computation based on how much the addition or deletion of a single data record can affect its output. A computation is differentially private if the possibility of getting a particular result changes less than a given threshold when a record is added or removed from the dataset. This threshold can be thought of as a privacy budget and can be divided among many computations to get more results and still satisfy a higher-level privacy goal. Because of this composability, differential privacy can be provided nearly generically by building on top of fundamental operations that add carefully chosen noise. To hide the presence of any individual record, these operations must be aggregates, but can be as general as "count the number of records for which a user-supplied function is true".
Probably the most attractive feature of differential privacy is that a trace producer does not need to guess which questions the trace should answer. Systems (such as [23] ) have been proposed where within a privacy budget, trace producers could allow researchers to write arbitrary queries against the raw data and get automatically obfuscated results. The privacy budget makes this less attractive because it requires that only to a limited set of trace consumers be granted access, and all their queries must contain aggregates. Also, many competitive concerns are not addressed by the differentially privacy guarantee which, by design, preserves aggregate values. Even for personal privacy concerns, there is a practical problem of how to set the privacy budget since it may not be clear how many records need to be masked to prevent the identification of one person's activity.
V. SOME PERILS OF EXCESSIVE OBFUSCATION
Obfuscation can be taken too far. The most common problem is missing information that is required for a desired analysis. For example, work evaluating the effectiveness of caching in a batch system [2] could not have been done on a trace summary like that proposed in [7] because that only included data sizes and compute times.
This section discusses a few of the difficulties that may arise when using an obfuscated trace.
A. Unavailable information
All traces are incomplete in some manner, just because some desirable information was not readily available from the system being traced.
Many real workloads are "half-open" loops: part of the workload is generated because prior tasks finished; other parts appear asynchronously. HTTP requests are an example [31] : some resources (e.g., images) are requested only because they are referenced by others (web pages). Job-and task-level workloads are likely to have this flavor, too: users may use higher-level tools (such as [6] , [9] , [26] , [35] ) to write workflows on top of a lower-level scheduler from which the trace is extracted. Unless the obfuscation is done with care, it is easy to cull the workflow's dependency information by mistake.
B. Missing semantics
Researchers analyzing traces frequently use knowledge of the purpose of the programs that appear in a trace. For example, this knowledge is important to argue that researcher's proposal would actually affect metrics that its users care about. Similarly, researchers modelling traces want to verify that their models are capturing attributes that are universal and not simply artifacts of one company's implementation.
Understanding the purpose of jobs within traces of shared infrastructure services is difficult. Standard sources, like job names, are not likely to survive obfuscation. The trace may provide many exportable hints of job purpose, like priorities, resource requests, and filenames, but these are imprecise and subject to company-specific quirks (such as defaults or approval requirements).
A researcher might use these hints to infer new scheduler constraints (such as deadlines) or to predict the workload. For example, proposals to automatically scale up and down allocations to a service (for power [21] or cost [36] ) depend on short-term workload predictions. These systems could train a workload model using the trace, but the researcher would not know whether the model learned properties that are universal (such as end-user request patterns) or quirks of the company (such as periodic automated jobs being released at a particular time).
In short, it is helpful to consider the purposes to which traces will be put when making them available. If the goal is to foster work on improved scheduling algorithms (say), then the traces should include information to aid both replay and understanding of the workload.
VI. OBFUSCATING OUR TRACE
In November 2011, we released a trace of 29 days of job requests and usage data for a medium-sized production compute cluster at Google that contained about 11 000 computers. [38] We used the techniques described in this paper; this section describes which ones we picked.
Our most difficult competitive concerns were addressed by subsetting: we selected a single, median-sized cluster to avoid revealing the size of the company's computing "fleet"; we chose an older cluster to avoid releasing sensitive configuration information about our latest machines; and we chose a cluster with a varied workload to avoid revealing too much about sensitive application performance or structure.
We took considerable care and time to explain and verify the trace, and provided explicit documentation about the meaning and origin of each of the trace fields and how they had been obfuscated [1] .
Before releasing the trace data, we checked it for internal consistency and against an alternate internal source of the trace information. These checks identified some bugs in our transformation code and our monitoring infrastructure that would have made the trace difficult to interpret, and might have been impossible for outside users to discover. We got feedback from external alpha testers, which helped up identify one case of a missing data field.
One of our goals was to support external research on jobscheduling, so we made sure to provide information about jobs that started and finished outside the time window of the trace.
In order to make the trace as consistent as possible, we chose to exclude computers that were statically assigned to particular uses or users. The price we paid was a small infidelity for jobs that spanned shared and dedicated machines, which we chose to discard, but the effect was tiny -only around 0.003% of the total load fell into this category.
We used a combination of the techniques discussed above to transform the trace fields, summarized in table I. For scheduling constraints on quantities like version numbers and spindle counts, we used a technique based on [32] . We sorted the used values for each machine attribute and assigned an integer to each value. We then normalized all the constraints (equality or inequality comparisons against attributes) to use these integers. For example, if machines in the trace had version 2.4, 2.6, and 3.0 of some software, we represented these versions as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A constraint like 'version >= 2.6' would be obfuscated to 'opaque > 1'; and 'version != 2.4 && version != 2.5' t o 'opaque != 1 && opaque != 0' (using 0 since 2.5 never appears on a machine).
For task priorities, which were integers over a large space in our raw data, we generated a list of all priorities that were used during our trace time period. We renumbered these sort values so the lowest became 0, the second-lowest 1, and so on. Since renumbered or not, the priority space is difficult to interpret, we provided a description of the purpose of some renumbered priorities to aid in the characterization of our workload. We indicated that particular renumbered priorities which were very cheap internally and that others received performance guarantees.
Text fields were obfuscated using a keyed cryptographic hash (HMAC-SHA256) with a different key for each field type, derived from a keyed cryptographic hash of the field name and data type using a single master key for the trace. We hid the identity of particular services by hashing job and user names in this fashion, but to allow correlation analyses we provided normalized job names that stay the same across job re-executions.
For resource-size data such as capacity, usage and scheduler request sizes, we linearly scaled the resource units so that the maximum machine capacity for each resource became 1.0. We also limited the precision so that the intervals between possible values would not trivially identify a "unit" quantity: we rounded the values to the closest multiple of approximately one-millionth and truncated their mantissas to 10 bits. Despite our obfuscation effort, we recognized that our rescaling of usage information was likely to be ineffective for at least some types of resources (such as CPU usage) -but we did so consciously.
We also provided some information in unobfuscated form, such as cycles per instruction and memory accesses per instruction measurements, since we did not believe it would otherwise be useful.
We believe that the balance we struck was able to meet the needs of our research colleagues and our own requirements for restricting some commercially-sensitive information.
VII. CONCLUSION
Removing private and commercially-sensitive information from traces without damaging their utility is challenging. Ultimately, all obfuscation techniques must strike a balance between supporting interesting analyses and the risk of revealing confidential information. A significant problem is the lack of certainty: one cannot prove that everything has really been sanitized.
Privacy concerns make it difficult to release precise information about user activities because the user information that makes those traces unique also poses a privacy risk. Competitive concerns create different challenges (e.g., releasing aggregate data may be undesirable), as well as some similar ones (e.g., job names may be as sensitive as customer names).
Applying the most effective obfuscation schemes will severely limit the analyses that can be performed. Nevertheless, this may be appropriate when fairly complete data is important (e.g., for evaluating schemes for balancing work between datacenters). Otherwise, it may be more useful to provide a more complete set of data from a smaller source than a small amount of data from a broad range of systems.
As always, there's no free lunch. Academics should recognise that the reasons for industry's hesitations are real, and important. If industry would like to foster higher-quality, more relevant research into their problems, they will need to find ways to accept some of the inherent risks, and make more data accessible. We hope that this paper will serve to provide guidance on the likely consequences, and best practices for doing so.
